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Abstract
Today, environmental economics is the response of the neoclassical economic school to the
ecological crisis, but at one time its leading contributors regarded it as a revolutionary development
that would change the conduct and content of economics as a discipline.  Understanding and
addressing environmental pollution was core to that potential paradigm shift.  In tracing the history
of conceptualising pollution as an externality and market failure this paper covers the development
of ideas by Marshall, Pigou, Pareto, Coase, Stigler, Samuelson, Ciciacy-Wantrup and Kapp. 
Pollution externality theory is shown to have incorporated an elitist ethics and liberal market
ideology.  As a market failure pollution was deemed a minor correctible error of the price system. 
Monetary valuation of social and environmental harm became the means of justifying optimal levels
of pollution.  Neoliberal theories of spreading property rights further watered down potential
interventionist aspects.  Bio-physical realism, in the work of Kneese, Ayres and d’Arge, and social
realism in Kapp’s theory of cost shifting were lost once environmental economics adopted a
deductivist mathematical formalism.  Kapp’s alternative theory is based on a classic institutionalists
economic understanding of cost shifting and power relations.  It advocates a public policy response
in the form of objective social minima achieved via regulation and planning.  This theory has until
now been successfully supressed to prevent a potential revolutionary paradigm shift in economic
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Environmental economics appeared in the 1960s, along with the growth in public 
environmental awareness, as a direct response to the rise of ecological and human health 
problems related to pollution (Spash 1999).  By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the promise of 
material wealth for all through economic growth and post World War II optimism in the 
abilities of science and technology were faltering.  Pollution from agro-chemicals, DDT and 
radiation from nuclear bomb testing were amongst the problems highlighted.1  Economic 
growth was strongly debated and increasingly criticised as positively misleading in terms of 
the consequences for human society (e.g., Mishan 1967, 1969a; Meadows et al. 1972; Daly 
1974; Hirsch 1977; Scitovsky 1976; Schumacher 1973).  In order to understand the 
predicament of human kind, the challenge appeared to be to create a totally new approach to 
economics. 
The contributions of economists, during the rise of modern environmentalism, 
developed around a distinct set of connected research agendas with pollution at the centre.  
First, there was the relationship of environmental problems to the growth economy, with its 
massive inputs of materials and energy, justified as necessary to meet the ever expanding 
wants of the consumer.  Second, there was the, apparently perplexing, question of how an 
economic system that was meant to create wealth, and well-being for all, was instead creating 
social and ecological harm as a normal part of business practice?  Third, there was the need to 
measure those harms (as social costs),2 leading to a sub-agenda of research into methods for 
the monetary valuation of environmental impacts to inform public policy.  Fourth, there was 
                                                 
1 Hundreds of nuclear weapons tests took place leading to rising public health concerns and a Partial 
Test Ban Treaty being signed in 1963. 
2 There were also recognised benefits (e.g. aesthetics, recreation) that economists associated with 
environmental change, and these were similarly to be measured and monetised. 
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the design, evaluation and recommendation of what constituted the best policy response (e.g. 
State regulation, planning, taxes/subsidies).  All these research agendas posed major potential 
challenges to the hegemonic economic theory that promoted resource efficient allocation as 
achievable via a self-regulating price mechanism based on voluntary decentralized exchange.3  
Domination of the profession by two distinct paradigms, namely economic growth and price-
making markets, was (implicitly) being opposed by a new transformative social-ecological 
economic paradigm (see Spash 2020). 
Evidence of extensive social costs from pollution undermined the price theory of 
neoclassical economics.  Environmental economics then appeared both innovative, 
progressive and potentially revolutionary.  The reality was to be a little different because the 
revolutionary endeavour faded into nothing more than mildly reformist or totally conformist 
policy advocacy.  Environmental economists soon conceptualised and delimited pollution to 
fit within a market-based capital accumulating economy rather than pursue economic 
transformation to address emerging social-ecological crises.  Even advocacy of pollution 
taxes diminished as new markets in pollution permits became the favoured ‘solution’.  From 
the 1980s onwards, the economics profession increased their faith in the ideal of self-
regulating markets.  The neoliberals of the Mont Pèlerin Society (e.g. Gary Becker, James 
Buchanan, Ronald Coase, Milton Friedman, Frederick Hayek, Frank Knight, George Stigler, 
Ludwig von Mises) pushed the neoclassicals from reformist State intervention to advocating a 
State in service of the corporation (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Mirowski 2013). 
                                                 
3 This paper is part of an ongoing project, addressing the struggle for revolutionary change in 
economics, that will be published as a book including coverage of the research agendas of economists 
during the rise of modern environmentalism.  Here a critical analysis in presented of treating pollution 
as a correctible market failure understood as a negative externality. 
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The rise of environmentalism can then be understood as reawakening a contestation in 
economics over the best system for allocating resources to achieve the social good of all, and 
specifically the role of a planned social economy versus price-making markets.  The issue was 
core to the socialist calculation debate of the 1920s and 1930s (Adaman and Devine 1996).  
Neoliberal Austrian economists, von Mises and Hayek, argued against a range of socialists 
from Otto Neurath, favouring a non-market economy in-kind, to Oskar Lange and Fred 
Taylor, supporting a market socialist model.4  Historically, Lange’s neoclassical modelling 
contributions were regarded as key to winning the debate in favour of the socialists by 
showing that government could achieve rational resource allocation using prices established 
through trial and error (Lange 1936, 1937; Lange and Taylor 1938). 
Kapp provides a direct link from the socialist calculation debate of the 1930s into the 
environmental economics debate of the 1970s.  His 1936 (German language) thesis criticises 
the positon of his supervisor von Mises by highlighting the importance of social costs (Berger 
2016, p. 22-34; 2017, p. 16-18).  He proceeded to develop an institutional theory that explains 
social and environmental problems as resulting from business enterprises’ deliberate ‘cost 
shifting’ practices (Kapp 1950, 1963).  In brief, neoclassically trained environmental 
economists’ misconceptualise pollution as unintended isolated ‘externalities’.  Social costs 
cannot meaningfully be assessed in monetary terms to be internalised.  Reforming price-
making markets via pollution taxes fails to address power relationships and the problematic 
structure of competitive markets.  Kapp’s realist social-ecological economic theory stands in 
paradigmatic opposition to the deductivist abstractions of neoclassical economists. 
This paper explores how alternative, realist explanations were pushed aside and 
pollution became characterised as a correctible market failure, external to actors decisions.  
                                                 
4 There were in fact several debates, see O'Neill (1996). 
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Next, Section II traces the history of thought on ‘externalities’ from Marshal to Pigou, 
including the adoption of Pareto efficiency under ‘new welfare economics’.  Pigou’s work is 
shown to have been misrepresented, as supporting an idealised optimal tax to correct minor 
market failure, ignoring his positions on legal and contractual institutions, criticism of 
markets and need for socialist reform of capitalism.  Central amongst those caricaturing Pigou 
was Coase, whose own ideas were co-opted by his neoliberal colleagues of the Chicago 
School, as explained in Section III.  A tripartite battle then developed with an emergent 
environmental economics fluctuating between neoclassical conformity and social-ecological 
realism while facing the rise of neoliberal ideology championed by an elite of economics 
professors.  Section IV documents pollution becoming formalised in environmental 
economics as an unproblematic abstract externality with Pareto optimal solutions.  Section V 
contrast this outcome with both early realist discussions in environmental economics and 
Kapp’s theory of social cost shifting.  I conclude with some reflections on the resulting failure 
of mainstream economists to address ecological crises (e.g. climate catastrophe) and the 
continuing and urgent need for a paradigm shift. 
II. PIGOUVIAN TAXES AND PARETO EFFICIENCY 
The line of reasoning adopted by environmental economists, about pollution being a market 
failure, is derived from a theory of industrial “external economies” originating with Marshall 
(1916 [1890]), and further developed by the conceptualisation of social costs in the work of 
Pigou (1920).  Marshall was concerned about social benefits from infrastructure and how one 
firm’s location can benefit from another’s (e.g. one builds a road and a second comes along 
and uses it without having paid anything).  Pigou (1920, p. 159-163) expanded on this idea to 
cover a range of factors outside the planning process. 
However, in the four editions of his widely cited book The Economics of Welfare, Pigou 
never uses the term ‘externalities’.  Instead, he talks of “divergences between marginal social 
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net product and marginal trade net product”, as well as “uncompensated services” and 
“incidental uncharged disservices” (Ibid).  Pigou gives several examples of disservices, 
including: building developments that remove play areas, injure the “health and efficiency of 
families living there”, crowd out existing properties and reduce air quality; running of motor 
cars that wear out the surface of roads; production and sale of intoxicants causing extra costs 
in terms of policemen and prisons; wars waged to obtain foreign trade and investment returns; 
and women doing factory work while pregnant impacting on the health of the child (Ibid, p. 
162-163).  He explains that some such problems, falling outside contract law, could be 
addressed by government interventions using economic incentives. 
“It is plain that divergences between private and social net product of the kinds we have 
so far been considering cannot, like divergences due to tenancy laws, be mitigated by a 
modification of the contractual relation between any two contracting parties, because 
the divergence arises out of a service or disservice rendered to persons other than the 
contracting parties.  It is, however, possible for the State, if it so chooses, to remove the 
divergence in any field by "extraordinary encouragements" or "extraordinary restraints" 
upon investments in that field. The most obvious forms which these encouragements 
and restraints may assume are, of course, those of bounties [i.e., subsidies] and taxes.” 
(Ibid, p. 168) 
The term “extraordinary encouragements” is borrowed from Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations 
(e.g., Smith 1976 [1776], p. 14, 182, 275, 493, 742, 838, 914).  Smith also uses variations 
such as extraordinary privileges, restrictions and restraints (Ibid, p. 864, 881, 914) and 
extraordinary taxes (Ibid, p. 1142).  These are general references by Smith to various forms of 
government intervention to encourage/discourage types of trade and industrial production.  
Pigou (1920) then proceeds to also give general examples of financial incentives in actual 
policy (e.g. taxing alcohol, housing developers paying for free playgrounds, petrol taxes and 
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motor car licenses, national insurance taxes, taxing income from foreign investments).5  
However, none of these cases involve economists calculating the (marginal) social costs to set 
the “bounties and taxes”. 
In a later work, Pigou (1949 [1937]) explicitly argues against the possibility of 
quantifying social costs.  He states that, “the practical difficulties of determining the right 
rates of bounty and duty would be extraordinarily great” (Ibid, p. 42).  He questions the 
economists’ ability to ascertain social cost in terms of money.  He specifically asks: “how are 
we to make the corresponding calculation for a factory industry the smoke of which increase 
the expenses of the public in washing and cleaning?” (Ibid, p. 43).  Similarly, he questions the 
ability to calculate benefits from planting forests that improve climatic conditions.  He makes 
clear that the examples of subsidies/taxes, that he gave in The Economics of Welfare, were not 
premised on such calculations being actualised when he states that: 
“so far as I know, no attempt has ever been made in a capitalist régime to use bounties 
and duties for bringing about adjustments of the kind I have been describing.  Up to the 
present suggestions in this matter have been confined to the writings of economists; and 
even they have never attempted the quantitative study that would be necessary before 
their suggestions could be applied to practice.” (Ibid) 
That social costs cannot be addressed as in “the writings of economists”, by a system of 
“bounties and duties” (i.e., internalised by subsidies and taxes) based on quantitative studies, 
runs counter to the claims made for ‘Pigouvian taxes’ by others, after Pigou’s demise.  
Concerning this impossibility of social cost calculation, Pigou himself speculates that 
                                                 
5 Other types of cases are also considered such as urban planning and zoning laws, slum clearance, 
worker retraining, maternity leave and liability for healthcare. 
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“Maybe, it demonstrates in this field the bankruptcy of capitalism”.6  So, somewhat 
amazingly, given his promotion by neoclassical economists as founder of the method for 
optimally internalising externalities via tax/subsidy,7 Pigou here argues against the possibility 
of the very tax which later bears his name. 
Pigou’s work also explicitly recognises the limits to markets and the need for central 
planning and regulation.  As he states, before praising the introduction of the 1909 Housing 
and Town Planning Act: 
“It is as idle to expect a well planned town to result from the independent activities of 
isolated speculators as it would be to expect a satisfactory picture to result if each 
separate square inch were painted by an independent artist.  No ‘invisible hand’ can be 
relied on to produce a good arrangement of the whole from a combination of separate 
treatments of the parts.  It is, therefore, necessary that an authority of wider reach 
should intervene and should tackle the collective problems of beauty, of air, and of 
light, as those other collective problems of gas and water have been already tackled.” 
(Pigou 1920, p. 170-171) 
                                                 
6 In attempting this social cost calculation he believes a central planning authority would fair no better 
than the government of a capitalist State. However, he concluded his book in favour of a socialist State 
agenda including removing inequalities via income taxation, investment in health and education, 
nationalisation of industries and the central bank, and national planning of most capital investment.  At 
the same time Pigou should not be read as some naïve advocate of government intervention, as 
ignorantly attempted by Coase (see Aslanbeigui and Oakes 2015, p. 166-169; Aguilera Klink 1994).  
Part II Chapter XVII “State Intervention” of his Economics of Welfare makes clear his awareness of 
the institutional context determining good outcomes from interventions by public authorities (Pigou 
1920). 
7 For example the Pigou Club established by Gregory Mankiw in 2006 has advocated ‘Pigouvian 
taxes’, e.g., to address human induced climate change and road congestion (Lovejoy Knight 2018, p. 
65).  Members have included: Gary Becker, Paul Krugman and Lawrence Summers (Aslanbeigui and 
Oakes 2015, p. 97). 
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Pigou has been selectively read, and the embedding of market institutions in a planning and 
legal system (including the role of contractual ties), that he recognised as essential, has 
conveniently been forgotten in the move to economic systems dominated by price-making 
markets where direct government intervention and regulation is derided as authoritarian 
control.  As Aguilera Klink (1994, p. 387) has made clear: “Contrary to the simplistic and 
biased interpretation which has been promoted, Pigou does not see state intervention as being 
synonymous with imposing taxes.” 
More generally, as noted by Kapp (1978 [1963], p. 40), the later dismissal by 
economists of problems in social cost calculation, and the narrowing down of the concept 
itself, resulted from the rise of ‘new welfare economics’ (e.g., Little 1950).  Its 
methodological individualism denies the existence of social phenomena and society itself as 
distinct or having emergent properties.  It claims to remove the need for social evaluation and 
defines social welfare as the sum of individual utilities.  The underlying ethical basis is 
preference utilitarianism.  Welfare comparisons across individuals (i.e. how much a change 
harms or benefits different individuals) are meant to be avoided by adopting the criteria of 
only making policies that make people better-off and none worse-off. 
This approach is attributed to the Italian statistician, economist and sociologist 
Vilfredo Pareto (1948-1923), and has become integral to neoclassical economists’ definition 
of efficiency (i.e. prescribing whether a resource reallocation would be desirable on grounds 
of maximising welfare or utility).  Most mainstream economists seem to regard this ‘Pareto 
Criterion’ as an uncontroversial concept divorced from ethics because efficiency itself is 
assumed an ‘objective’ criterion (a paradigmatic dichotomy being enforced between 
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positive/fact and normative/value).8  Some suspicion as to the Pareto Criterion’s ethical bias 
might have been raised by the fact that its originator supported elitist social theories (Buzaglo 
2018), and welcomed Mussolini’s fascism (Losito and Segre 1992).  Given the importance 
economists have attributed to Pareto’s ideas an extensive footnote is include here on his 
political ideology, which is regarded as especially important because it goes largely 
unremarked.9 
Consistent with Pareto’s political ideology, the theory neoclassical economists have 
adopted as their defining (Pareto) efficiency criterion allows policies to be designated as 
‘optimal’ that would make an elite better-off while doing nothing for anyone else.  That is, the 
                                                 
8 Some debates occurred around alternatives such as a minmax criterion stimulated by Rawls Theory 
of Justice (e.g., Sen 1976), and intergenerational ethics/equity (see Spash 1993). However, economic 
orthodoxy relegated ethics to distributional issues as if divorced from efficiency on the basis of a naïve 
objectivism (see Bromley 2009 [1990]). 
9 Pareto regarded parliaments as the instruments of private capitalist interests, allowing the populace to 
be dominated and manipulated by the plutocratic ruling class.  He wrote supporting fascist violence as 
a legitimate response to weak governments, political anarchy and economic recession. “Fascism’s 
ascension to power was thus greeted by Pareto as the salvation of Italy” (Losito and Segre 1992, p. 
72).  In 1922 Pareto was honoured by Mussolini with a seat in the Fascist senate, which he accepted 
after declining the same appointment from Italy’s post-war government (Buzaglo 2018, p. 98).  His 
works enjoyed immense popularity in the 1920s and 1930s despite his pseudo-scientific approach.  
The publication of the English translation of Pareto’s Mind and Society in 1935 was closely followed 
by Franz Borkcnau’s exposure of its logical inconsistencies, contradictions and sophistry.  A review of 
Borkcnau’s book in The Spectator states that “Pareto may be described and best understood as a 
precursor of Fascism” (Read 1936).  As explained by Losito and Segre (1992), his ideas were 
selectively employed to endorse and legitimate Mussolini’s dictatorship and his reception by Italian 
Fascists varied from uncritical acceptance to total rejection.  However, regardless of the specific 
political reception by Italian Fascists of Mussolini’s party, there are clear core aspects of his ideas and 
writing supporting and informing Fascism in general.  Vander Zanden (1960) has systematically 
appraised, explained and presented these as his anti-intellectualism and anti-rationalism, quasi-
biological theory of the elite, militant vilification and hatred of democracy and glorification of force as 
an instrument for acquiring and maintaining power. 
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ruling elite is empowered to make policy changes if these can be justified as improving their 
own well-being while leaving others in the same situation as before.  In fact, the Pareto 
Criterion is typically unworkable because somebody is nearly always made worse-off.  Hence 
Kaldor and Hicks tried to salvage the situation by putting forward an alternative prescriptive 
criterion where only the ability to potentially (but not actually) compensate for harm was now 
promoted as a good test for making efficient policy.  Mishan (1969b, p. 225) notes that Kaldor 
and Hicks erroneously claimed “an objective method of detecting increases in ‘wealth’ or 
‘efficiency’ had been discovered”, and its implications were also ethically unacceptable.  In 
addition, this merely reintroduced the problem of assessing welfare differences; that is, the 
amount of monetary transfers necessary to leave those harmed (e.g. by factory pollution) 
potentially no worse-off would have to be determined and compared with the gains of those 
made better-off (e.g. by consuming polluting factory products).  Other alternatives put 
forward were to make explicit judgements over income distribution via social welfare 
functions or weightings (Hanley and Spash 1993, p. 48-50).  However, such problems are 
learnt by mainstream economists, during their training, and duly forgotten.  Thus the goal of 
(potential) Pareto efficiency has remained. 
New welfare economics then combined with externality theory to justify at best mild 
reformism, and more typically ‘business as usual’, in response to ecological destruction, 
because the projects causing this destruction could be deemed to create greater benefits (to the 
elite) than harms (to the poor).  This may also be described more crudely as jobs (code for 
capitalist profits) are more valuable than the environment (i.e. health of poor people and non-
humans).  Pollution impacts could, the argument goes, potentially be paid for and harm 
compensated, making nobody worse-off and somebody better-off.  More than this, contra 
Pigou, the harm could be converted into money and included in a calculation of marginal 
social costs relating to a production process so that the price mechanisms could be adjusted to 
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achieve allocative (Pareto) efficiency, i.e., externalities could be optimally internalised.  
However, this theory of pollution externalities took some decades to appear. 
III. RISING NEOLIBERALISM: PERVERTING PIGOU & CO-OPTING COASE 
The discussion of ‘external diseconomies’ developed little from Marshall until the 1960s and 
paid only passing attention to pollution with the two substantive exceptions of Pigou (1920) 
and Kapp (1950).10  Pigou (1920) has some passages that are amazingly prescient of the 
environmental movement, covering a range of concerns, including: urban and industrial air 
pollution (pp. 160-161), natural resource depletion and species extinction (p. 28), frivolous 
fossil fuel use for convenience at the expense of future generations (p.28), soil nutrient loss 
(p. 38), and much on waste of resources by businesses (including advertising).  However the 
environmental entries are relatively brief and purely illustrative, at best covering a few 
paragraphs each.  The first major economic work on the environment is the book by Kapp 
(1950), which is distinctive both in approach and extent of coverage, including two chapters 
entirely dedicated to pollution (i.e. air and water) and presenting empirical evidence on social 
costs (I return to Kapp in Section V). 
Despite Kapp’s 1950 book being widely reviewed, including by Knight of the Chicago 
School (Berger 2017, p. 24), and translated into six different languages (Kapp 1978 [1963], p. 
vii-viii), economists failed to take seriously the empirical phenomena that is pollution.  A 
strange turn of events was then how Coase (1960), in an attack on Pigou, stimulated his 
                                                 
10 Debates occurred concerning producer-producer economies, economies of scale (decreasing as 
diseconomies and increasing as economies), pecuniary and technological economies, and internal and 
external economies.  Thus, Ellis and Fellner (1943, p. 502, 510) specifically distinguish their 
discussion from Pigou’s “genuine diseconomies” concerning social vs. private costs and pollution.  
Knight (1924), in contradistinction to Pigou, discussed road congestion as a resource waste to be 
addressed by private property rights and maximising rent (see Mishan 1965, p. 17-18). 
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neoliberal colleagues to write about such externalities in their defence of price-making 
markets against government intervention (e.g. Buchanan and Stubblebine 1962; Demsetz 
1964).  Even Kapp’s book then got a passing critical citation from Buchanan (1962, p. 19).11  
Stigler (1966, p. 110-114) summarised the neoliberals favoured property rights solution as the 
‘Coase Theorem’.  This sudden attention contrasts strongly with how Stigler, like others, 
previously side-lined pollution problems. 
In the 1949 edition of his major work on price theory, Stigler devotes two short 
paragraphs to the pollution related discrepancy between private and social cost, giving the 
example of “the damage done by the smoke which pours from his [the producers] factory's 
chimneys”, while referring the reader to the “impressive list of such disharmonies” given by 
Pigou.  He then summarises the policy response to such ‘disharmonies’ as follows: 
“No single principle underlies them, and they are eliminated largely by ad hoc policies. 
Such policies include not only private activity (for example, cooperation) but also state 
interference by the use of the police power (zoning), taxes (automobiles, liquor), 
subsidies (conservation), dissemination of information (foods, drugs, securities), and 
numerous other devices.” (Stigler 1949, p. 107) 
This broad range of possible institutional arrangements seems to summarise Pigou’s account, 
but not the ad hoc dismissal nor lack of underlying principle.  While Stigler states these things 
are “valid, and indeed, important”, at this point in time they do not seem important enough for 
him to spend much time addressing, nor does he draw any serious implications for price 
theory. 
                                                 
11 Buchanan opposed the assumption of neoclassical welfare economists that the State was a 
benevolent actor whose intervention would efficiently correct market failures (Mirowski and Plehwe 
2009, p. 324). 
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This situation continued more generally in the 1950s.  Despite placing both external 
economies and diseconomies in the title of his work, Meade (1952) focusses almost 
exclusively on the former, which he relates to unpaid factors of production in commercial 
industries, exemplified primarily by a beekeeper’s domesticated bees pollinating a 
commercial apple orchard.  Scitovsky (1954) notes the potential for activities of a producer 
impacting on people’s “personal satisfaction” and occurring “in ways that do not operate 
through the market mechanism”.  More specifically he states that: “These may be called the 
producer's ‘direct’ (i.e., nonmarket) influence on personal satisfaction and are best known by 
the example of the factory that inconveniences the neighborhood [sic] with the fumes or noise 
that emanate from it” (Scitovsky 1954, p. 144).  However, like Meade, his primary concern is 
with Marshallian industrial external economies affecting business profitability and 
productivity.  The external diseconomy, as found in the case of industrial pollution, he thinks 
is “exceptional, because most instances of it can be and usually are eliminated by zoning 
ordinances and industrial regulation concerned with public health and safety” (Ibid). 
A distinct shift occurs with Coase (1960) who focuses a very long article entirely on 
“those actions of business firms which have harmful effects on others” (Ibid, p. 1) and 
specifically addresses pollution.  His favourite example (mentioned 62 times) is smoke 
emanating from a chimney or factory.  He makes no mention of diseconomies, nor any 
connections to that (minimal) literature, but rather employs the terms damage, harm, harmful 
effect and nuisance.  He claims economists have “largely followed” Pigou concerning polluter 
liability leading to conclusions with which “most economists” agree, and by the second 
paragraph this has become the “traditional approach” (Ibid, p. 1-2).  The only support given 
for this claimed consensus in approach is a single reference citing the case of stream pollution 
in the textbook by Stigler (1952, p. 105), which on examination proves to have cut down the 
text over the 1949 edition (cited above) and covers stream pollution with five words in 
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parenthesis!  Undaunted by the lack of evidence, Coase entitles Section IX of his paper “The 
Pigovian Tradition”.  This Coase (1960, p. 39) explicitly admits is based purely on his 
personal anecdotal conjectures relating to an oral tradition amongst those with whom he has 
spoken!? 
Coase narrows the scope of his critique to focus on problems relating to (idealised 
optimal) pollution taxes, as if this had been Pigou’s primary, or indeed only, concern.  He 
problematises the attribution of liability to polluters by raising the reciprocal character of 
harm (i.e. without a victim there would be no harm) and suggests that under alternative 
institutional arrangements liability can change.  The entire focus of his paper, excepting his 
totally contradictory ending (see Aguilera Klink 1994, p. 390), is that policy on harm requires 
weighing-up the financial costs and benefits of the alternatives, using the value of production 
as measured by the market.  As Coase (1960, p. 42) remarks with respect to smoke zoning 
laws (which might remove polluting factories from residential areas): “The aim of such 
regulation should not be to eliminate smoke pollution but rather to secure the optimum 
amount of smoke pollution, this being the amount which will maximise the value of 
production”.  He therefore embeds the problem within the price-making market, market 
values and willingness-to-pay which depends on ability to pay. 
The ‘Coase Theorem’, later formulated by Stigler (1966, p. 110-114), claims well 
defined property rights ‘solve’ pollution problems optimally.  The attribution to Coase is as 
misleading as the Pigouvain tax attributed to Pigou by Coase.  Indeed, Coase (1991) himself 
referred to it as the ‘infamous Coase Theorem’.  This neo-Coasian Stigler Theorem basically 
relates to a scenario, used by Coase to open his article, where harm can be optimally 
addressed by a freely negotiated contract given very specific idealised conditions in a highly 
simplified world with only two actors.  Coase used this simplistic ‘blackboard economics’ or 
‘toy model’ in part to expose the limitations and theoretical unreality of neoclassical 
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economists’ deductivism, which stood in contrast with the second half of his paper using 
empirical legal case studies (Frischmann and Marciano 2014).  What the abstract simple 
model achieves is to set down the core conceptual parameters within which further discussion 
is to be held.  More specifically, pollution policy is then framed in terms of monetary costs 
and benefits, in a world where agents possess equal power and knowledge, and consequences 
are knowable and known.  When relaxing the assumptions and increasing the number of 
actors (i.e. attempting some realism), the result is formulated as creating high ‘transactions 
costs’ preventing the supposed ‘solution’, and results in having to admit that “the government 
has powers which might enable it to get some things done at a lower cost than could a private 
organisation” (Coase 1960, p. 17).  Some rambling conjectures and qualifications, worrying 
about how economists might over-estimate the advantages of governmental regulation, end in 
his admitting this is merely his personal ‘belief’ and that what he really wants is that 
economists undertake explicit policy evaluation (i.e. weighing-up costs and benefits) not 
reject government intervention (Coase 1960, p. 18). 
However, Coase was not as neutral about private property rights, or the social structure 
of the economy, as some have tried to suggest (e.g. Frischmann and Marciano 2014).  This is 
clear from his own summary of what his work aimed to achieve: 
“[…] the rights which individuals possess, with their duties and privileges, will be, to a 
large extent what the law determines.  As a result the legal system will have a profound 
effect on the working of the economic system and may in certain respects be said to 
control it.  It is obviously desirable that these rights should be assigned to those who can 
use them most productively and with incentives that lead them to do so […] this can 
come about only if there is an appropriate system of property rights, and they are 
enforced, […]” (Coase 1991). 
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This makes clear that his approach to the economy, pollution and environmental harm, is 
embedded-in and delimited by a productivist ideology which is structured around individuals 
and their property rights.12  Coase’s reduction of the failure to address environmental 
pollution to high transaction costs is also inherently conservative and restricts policy to the 
status quo.  Hence, neoliberals could claim that where voluntary negotiation fails pollution 
must already be ‘optimal’ (costs of control higher than the benefits)—a Panglossian flaw in 
their logic noted by Mishan (1971a).  Of course, they also need to negate the counter 
argument that governments/regulators can use a variety of institutional arrangements that 
make their intervention more efficient, i.e. cheaper (Coase 1960, p. 17-18).  Later a neoliberal 
fall-back position, consistent with Coase, was advocacy of creating new markets in tradable 
pollution permits that basically give property rights to polluters and create new environmental 
commodities (Crocker 1966; Dales 1968).  Markets are simply instituted processes, but, 
contrary to the assumption of neoliberals, they are not necessarily the best institutions for 
attaining social goals, a point emphasised by Pigou. 
As Aguilera Klink (1994) explains, there is really no difference between Pigou and 
Coase in term of their institutional understanding because both recognise the role of 
contractual ties in defining a market economy.  Both Pigou and Coase accept the central role 
of institutional arrangements and Coase (1960, p. 29) explicitly notes Pigou as being correct 
in this regard.  However, Coase persisted in caricaturing Pigou (e.g. Coase 1991), ignoring 
their similarities.13  He specifically failed to credit Pigou with recognising the importance of 
contract and law in making an economy operational.  Even stranger, Coase (1960, p. 43) 
                                                 
12 Note, a corporation is an individual according to the law in the USA 
13 That Coase misrepresents Pigou is documented and exemplified in the review by Mishan (1965, p. 
29-32) who remarks on Coase’s “lengthy, indefinite, and somewhat repetitious arguments” attacking 
Pigou (Ibid, p. 30).  Aguilera Klink (1994) notes Coase’s biased critique and how he accuses Pigou of 
lacking clarity in his exposition while himself being unclear and contradictory. 
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admitted (in apparent total contradiction of the preceding 42 pages, as noted by Aguilera 
Klink 1994, p. 390) to the overwhelming problems with calculating social costs in 
productivist monetary terms and that “problems of welfare economics must ultimately 
dissolve into a study of aesthetics and morals”.14 
The caricature of Pigou by Coase led to the Pigouvian tax being regarded by neoliberals 
as a seemingly unnecessary regulatory intervention.  The caricature of Coase, by his fellow 
neoliberals of the Chicago School (e.g. Stigler), equated spreading private property rights to 
everything with defence of American capitalism against government intervention to address 
pollution.  According to Mirowski (2013, p. 335-336): 
“the so-called Coase Theorem was an intentional intervention to undermine and 
dissolve the whole neoclassical notion of “externalities,” and the theory of public goods 
built around it. […] the neoliberal solution is to enlist the strong state to allow the 
market to find its own way to the ultimate solution.” 
This seems true of the use neoliberals made of Coase’s work, if not entirely true of Coase 
himself whose ambivalent and contradictory remarks left the possibility open for different 
forms of government intervention. 
The ensuing dichotomy of pollution policy between optimal tax and spreading private 
property rights took over two decades to be firmly established.  Coase was wrong to assume 
there was some major consensus about an economic theory of pollution.  The ‘Pigouvian 
tradition’ was in part created by Coase’s article and only took effect once the delimited 
concept of pollution externalities as a market failure was established within environmental 
economics. 
                                                 
14 This vague statement with an illusive meaning is claimed by Coase to be following Frank Knight. 
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IV. POLLUTION AS AN EXTERNALITY 
The origins of the term externality/externalities relating to pollution are hard to trace and its 
early usage abstract, limited as to practical examples and inconsistent as to implications.  In 
the early 1960s theoretical papers on diseconomies and social costs started using the term and 
making passing reference to highly simplistic examples of localised industrial smoke 
pollution.  Coase’s paper stimulated critical discussion of Pigouvian taxes/subsidies as a 
means of achieving Pareto optimality when confronting such ‘externalities’ (Turvey 1963; 
Buchanan and Stubblebine 1962; Wellisz 1964; Buchanan 1962).  An earlier reference using 
the term ‘externalities’ is Bator (1958), who includes discussion of the importance of 
Samuelson’s (1954) work on public goods as being connected to aspects of externalities, 
although Samuelson does not use the term and only makes one brief reference to ‘external 
effects’. 
Kapp (1978 [1963], p. 8) attributes the term to the textbook by Samuelson (1961, p. 
476) in which he states this to be the divergence between private marginal cost and the “true 
social marginal cost” (see also Ibid, p. 688).15  Samuelson (1961, p. 475-476) alternates 
between the terms externalities and external diseconomies.  Examples specified are smoke 
pollution from steel production and urban smog “from each man’s auto and factory”.  Then, 
rather bizarrely, he states: “The greatest external diseconomy of all results from one country’s 
setting off nuclear bombs”, causing genetic mutation, abnormal births and potential for 
making life impossible.  He presumably has in mind nuclear testing (not war), but why this 
should qualify as an economic (negative) externality goes unexplained.  Preceding this, 
                                                 
15 Kapp cites only p.476, but the main entry is pp.475-476 with a footnote referencing Pigou.  
Samuelson also uses the term ‘external diseconomies’.  Additional occurrences of externalities are on 
pages 478, 678 and 805.  The index only references diseconomies (not externalities) and inaccurately, 
only p.192, where the standard smoke from a factory is mentioned, missing the longer (but still brief) 
main entry; diseconomies are also mentioned on page 688. 
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Samuelson has just stated that external diseconomies “are defined as harmful effects that 
result from one man’s production upon other people” (Samuelson 1961, p. 475).  What then is 
the ‘production’?  There is nothing productive about creating and exploding a nuclear bomb!  
Indeed what has this to do with anything that might be deemed the realm of neoclassical 
economics?  Perhaps here we see the developing imperialism of mainstream economics as it 
extends into all fields regardless of the relevance of its ability to provide any scientific 
knowledge or explanatory insight. 
The loose exposition proceeds with Samuelson noting, without references or further 
examples, that there are “countless examples” of such negative externalities.  He then states 
that: “wherever there are externalities a strong case can be made for supplanting complete 
individualism by some kind of group action”, and an important aspect is “causing free pricing 
to be non-optimal” (Ibid).  This would seem to indicate a major and widespread issue, 
potentially challenging the foundations of economic price theory, its methodological 
individualism and liberal political ideology.  However, after stating “No more need be said at 
this point about externalities”, little more is said and negative externalities/external 
diseconomies are basically dropped as a topic. 
A seemingly independent and earlier source of the term externalities is a paper on 
watershed management by Ciriacy-Wantrup (1959).  He addresses problems in public policy 
evaluation, especially applied cost-benefit analysis, and questions claims of Pareto optimality.  
His policy orientation contrasts with the abstract theoretical, mathematical and modelling 
presentations of other early papers.  He notes a frequent argument is “that market prices are 
the signalling system that steers Western economies toward the social-welfare optimum”, so 
knowing why they do not, and cannot, do so seems important (Ibid, p. 215).  A three point 
categorisation is used to structure price system failure: (i) non-existent price signals; (ii) price 
signals failing to reach decision-making agents, but getting to others; (iii) defined ‘distorted’ 
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price signals.  Externalities (classical and neoclassical external economies and diseconomies) 
fall under (ii), and he states that: “In watershed economics, these externalities are discussed 
largely under the labels ‘offsite’ and ‘indirect’ benefits and costs” (Ibid, p. 217).  In light of 
the prominence later give to Coase (1960) it is interesting to find Ciriacy-Wantrup had 
already recognised and emphasised that this was a “vital area for cooperative research 
between economics and other social sciences, especially law and public administration” (Ibid, 
see also Ciriacy-Wantrup 1952).  Water quality management was also soon a pioneering area 
of pollution research for environmental economists (Kneese 1964; Kneese and Bower 1968). 
By the mid-60s Castle (1965), an agricultural economist familiar with the work of 
Ciriacy-Wantrup, can be found critically discussing policy on pollution externalities.  He 
questions the role of the market and cost-benefit policy evaluation, suggesting the need for 
non-market institutions.  More emphatically he states that: “The economics of quality of the 
environment is emerging as a problem of major importance” (Castle 1965, p. 548).  
Realisation of the impacts from agro-chemical farming had been placed in the public 
consciousness by Carson’s (1987 [1962]) best selling Silent Spring.  Yet, despite this 
apparently developing and expanding attention to pollution, half a decade later, in his review 
of the economic literature on externalities, Mishan (1971b, p. 1) noted that: 
“although environmental spillovers have been prominent in the news over the last few 
years, the bulk of the recent literature has confined its investigations to inter-industry, 
inter-firm, and inter-person externalities.  Economists respond to real world problems 
with a time lag, initially making use of more familiar, if less relevant, bits of apparatus.” 
A formalised neoclassical theory of pollution externalities undoubtedly became more widely 
acknowledged after the establishment in 1974, by d’Arge and Kneese, of the Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management (JEEM), and in 1978 a related academic 
association.  The practical policy content originally proposed for JEEM was sacrificed to 
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mathematical models and theoretical expositions that won the journal respect amongst 
mainstream economists, but embedded its approach in a highly abstract, deductive and 
restrictive neoclassical framework (Spash 1999, p. 420).  Soon an externality theory of 
pollution was appearing in the new neoclassical textbooks on environmental economics, along 
with the now dominant idea of optimally internalising externalities via ‘Pigouvian taxes’ as 
opposed to less efficient regulation via legally set standards (e.g., Pearce 1978 [1976]; Mäler 
1974; Baumol and Oates 1979). 
In general, environmental economists concentrated on developing means of correcting 
markets by taxes/subsidies and only later by creating new markets in pollution rights (e.g. 
Tietenberg 1985).  Optimal pollution control policy was backed by extending cost-benefit 
analysis to calculate environment externalities (Kneese 1984).  Others, like Baumol and Oates 
(1971), dropped the pretence of precise monetary calculation of externalities, and advocated 
‘somewhat arbitrary’ pollution standards, but still recommended pollution taxes (i.e., pricing) 
to attain them because “prices can achieve a specified reduction in pollution levels at 
minimum cost to the economy” (Ibid, p. 42).  This more humble position qualifies the 
pollution externality approach, but the paradigmatic positions of reliance on market 
efficiency, pricing and cost-benefit analysis remained.  As Mirowski (2013, p. 335) notes: 
“the neoclassical solution is for the state to mimic the way an ideal market should have 
performed, in order to rectify these unfortunate lacunae”. 
In fact, textbook expositions maintained treatment of environmental problems as minor 
aberrations in an otherwise perfectly functioning price-making market system.  The 
‘Pigouvian tax’ did not equate to the State running the economy.  As Beckerman (1972, p. 
327) assertively and arrogantly stated: 
“most of my economist colleagues have always known […] that the problem of 
environmental pollution is a simple matter of correcting a minor resource allocation 
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problem by means of pollution charges, and that most of the common objections to such 
a policy can be demolished with the aid of no more economics than that which is the 
stock-in-trade of any second-year economics student”. (emphasis added) 
The early environmental economics textbook by Pearce (1978 [1976]) included chapters 
promoting “Methods of Securing the Optimal Amount of Pollution” and “Cost-benefit 
Analysis of Pollution: The Practice”.  He persisted in championing this approach throughout 
his life (Pearce, Markandya, and Barbier 1989) and even for greenhouse gases (Pearce 2003).  
Hence the rhetoric of ‘internalising externalities’, and ‘getting the prices right’ to ‘solve’ 
environmental problems, became part of the paradigmatic dogma of correcting these 
anomalous market failures. 
V. POLLUTION AS A COST SHIFTING SUCCESS 
Interestingly, the conceptualisation of pollution as externality, and associated correction of 
market failure via pricing, was already contradicted by environmental economists’ own work 
on the laws of physics (Kneese, Ayres, and d'Arge 1970a).  What was termed ‘materials 
balance theory’ incorporated the law of conservation of mass (i.e. mass can neither be created 
nor destroyed).  The conclusion was that pollution is all pervasive and a normal part of 
economic activity.  Externalities associated with the disposal of residuals from modern 
consumption and production activities cannot then be treated as exceptional, rare or 
unimportant.  As Kneese, Ayres and d′Arge (1970, p. 4-5) make very clear: 
“In reality they are a normal, indeed inevitable, part of these processes.  Their economic 
significance tends to increases as economic development proceeds, and the ability of the 
natural environment to receive and assimilate them is an important natural resource of 
rapidly increasing value.  We suggest below that the common failure to recognize these 
facts in economic theory may result from viewing the production and consumption 
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processes in a manner which is somewhat at variance with the fundamental physical law 
of conservation of mass.” 
An almost identical passage appears in Ayres and Kneese (1969, p. 282-283).  There they 
criticise their colleagues discussing pollution for regarding such diseconomies as “freakish 
anomalies” (Ibid, p. 287).  They admonish the economics profession as follows (Ibid, p. 282): 
“Despite tremendous public and governmental concern with problems such as 
environmental pollution, there has been a tendency in the economics literature to view 
externalities as exceptional cases.  They may distort the allocation of resources but can 
be dealt with adequately through simple ad hoc arrangements.” 
Their own perspective is cited as being like that of Kapp (1950).  They recognise that 
addressing pollution as an externality to be internalised via market prices “implies a central 
planning problem of impossible difficulty, both from the standpoint of data collection and 
computation” (Ayres and Kneese 1969, p. 295).  Once the all pervasiveness of pollution is 
apparent, due to economic growth and the laws of physics, then so also is the way in which 
pollution is misconceptualised as ‘external’ to actors decisions rather than internal to 
economic agents modus operandi in any competitive capital accumulating economic system.  
All of his would seem to suggest a radically different theory of pollution from that in the 
impending textbook approach. 
Yet, Ayres and Kneese exemplify the paradigmatic conflict.  While recognising the 
scale of the problem, and impossibility of the neoclassical ‘solution’, they proceed to employ 
a neoclassical general equilibrium model where pollution becomes a correctable market 
failure.  Pollution problems arise “because there exist no social institutions that permit the 
resources in question to be ‘owned’, and exchanged in the market” (Ibid, p. 291).  They then 
immediately claim allocation of resources corresponding to a Pareto optimum requires 
moderation by a market or a surrogate, i.e. simulation via shadow prices.  In another 
 
24 
contradiction, they add that “the problem of achieving Pareto optimality reaches beyond 
devising appropriate shadow prices and involves the planning and execution of investments 
with public goods aspects” (Ibid, p. 295).  Their conclusion continues with a disconnected 
recommendation of both “planning and control” in regional economies and devising pollution 
policy on the basis of estimating the monetary value of externalities and control costs (Ibid, p. 
296). 
The inconsistencies and failures to pursue the logic of their original natural science 
insights arise due to paradigmatic conformity.  As Kapp (1969, p. 334) explains: “Economists 
brought up in the neoclassical tradition of micro and general equilibrium analysis have 
frequently chosen to protect the conventional system by introducing new or more explicit 
assumptions in an effort to strengthen the model against the obvious theoretical challenge 
raised by social costs.”  Kneese, as a leading environmental economist advocating cost-
benefit analysis, increasingly embraced the neoclassical paradigm in contradiction of physical 
realism.  In paradigmatic contrast, Ayres, who was trained in physics, broke away from 
neoclassical economics to help establish the field of industrial ecology (Ayres and Ayres 
1996; Ayres and Simonis 1994).  This developed ideas of social metabolism (see Krausmann 
2017), which later connected to Karl Polanyi’s substantive economics, taken as favouring an 
explicit commitment to planning over price-making markets (Gerber and Scheidel 2018).  The 
revolutionary potential of environmental economics can then be seen as having been 
dependent upon how far different economist were prepared to take the logic of their 
arguments in contravention of the paradigmatic neoclassical belief in doing what price-
making markets would ideally do. 
Another exemplary case of paradigmatic conformity is d′Arge who co-founded JEEM 
with Kneese and, similarly, thereafter maintained neoclassical conformity.  In total contrast to 
such conformity he co-authored the book on materials balance theory recognising pollution as 
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all pervasive (Kneese, Ayres, and d'Arge 1970b).  Complementing this critical insight, in a 
little know article with Hunt, he explores the idea of a total reinterpretation of social 
relationships integral to mainstream economic understanding (Hunt and d'Arge 1973).  This 
article shows how the combination of pervasive pollution with standard economic 
assumptions about agents and markets turns economic theory on its head.  The argument runs 
as follows.  Homo œconomicus will maximize the value of participating in organised markets 
and creating nonmarket transactions.  Such agents gain by imposing losses on others, and they 
gain more the more they can shift costs on to others.  The same incentive Adam Smith 
regarded as producing only unintended good is responsible for selecting only highly 
productive ‘external effects’.  All individuals acting independently to ‘externalise costs’ will 
yield a maximum of these costs imposed on others.  Rather than the benevolent invisible 
hand, guiding the allocation of resources to the benefit of all, the capitalist price-making 
market economy had an ‘invisible foot’, continuously booting the majority of people in the 
backside (Hunt and d'Arge 1973, p. 348).  Successful agents shift costs on to others to the 
maximum of their ability and must be paid, or rather bribed, to reduce their damaging 
activities by the recipient of their costs.  Such ideas were totally contrary to the 
conceptualisation of pollution externalities as correctible market failures that was central to 
the new neoclassical environmental economics. 
Nothing of the ‘invisible foot’ thesis was in fact novel or original in the early 1970s.  
Kapp (1950) had published his major work twenty years earlier based on a Marshallian 
approach to pollution, but including his important insights into social cost shifting; a position 
apparent from the first sentence of the 1948 preface (Kapp 1971 [1950], p. xxvii).  In his later 
revised work the limitations of and divorce from the neoclassical framework was made even 
more forceful and explicit (Kapp 1963).  Going in the opposite direction to environmental 
economists, the need to move beyond the conceptualisation of social costs as externalities was 
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made increasingly clear by Kapp (1969, 1970).  His work offers an extensive and thorough 
exploration and explanation of social cost shifting, all be it without the connection to the laws 
of physics, which only strengthen his argument.16 
Kapp recognised, on social and institutional grounds, that despite the increasing 
discussion of externalities, what remained unrecognised, or deliberately supressed and 
assumed away, was that “these so-called external diseconomies and social benefits are not 
isolated cases but are widespread and inevitable phenomena under conditions of business 
enterprise” (Kapp 1978 [1963], p. 8).  Kapp rejected the idea of pollution as an externality 
because it inaccurately describes what are deliberate acts of cost shifting in the search for 
profit; a critique that corresponds to that of institutional economist Clark’s theories 
concerning the operation of the firm (Berger 2017, p. 99-114).  Accordingly, success in 
business is achieved by passing on costs to others, and/or taking benefits from them without 
incurring personal costs. 
Kapp (1978 [1963], p. 14) defines social costs as harmful effects and inefficiencies 
shifted to others that are: (i) avoidable and (ii) part of productive activities.  For example, 
businesses might avoid or minimise harmful pollution created in their production processes, 
but instead expose their workers and the wider environment to increase profits.  The pursuit of 
private gain places a premium on the minimization of the private costs of current production, 
and the more that this is emphasised the greater the probability of social costs.  The 
implication for neoclassical theory is that price-making markets do not achieve efficient 
outcomes nor can price adjustments to competitive markets be understood as in any sense 
optimal.  Prices reflect the power and ability to realise cost shifting. 
                                                 
16 Shortly before his death he had become aware of this through reading Georgescu-Roegen (1971). 
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“For if economic units with unequal power are able to shift part of their costs to 
others—and moreover are able to plan their sales and hence consumers’ demand 
through sales promotional activities—market costs and prices must be regarded as more 
or less arbitrary and indeed unreliable measures of economic rationality.” (Kapp 1969, 
p. 335) 
Production and allocation set within price-making markets is highly problematic because this 
institutional structure actually incentivises social cost shifting.  “Pollution effects are not 
minor side-issues and cannot be easily corrected by ad hoc measures of legislative control, 
chosen and preferred because they are more or less compatible with the market system” 
(Kapp 1971 cited by Berger 2017, p. 184).  The problem is the market system itself. 
There is then a failure at the heart of neoclassical economics as a means for addressing 
environmental pollution and other social costs. 
“For the fact that private entrepreneurs are able to shift part of the total costs of 
production to other persons or to the community as a whole, points to one of the most 
important limitations of the scope of neoclassical value theory.  As long as it continues 
to confine itself to market value neoclassical economics will fail to assimilate to its 
reasoning and to its conceptual system many of the costs (and returns) which cannot 
be expressed in dollars and cents.” (Kapp 1971 [1950], p. 11) 
In his original work Kapp (1950) does offer estimates of some annual monetary costs of air 
pollution, but as indicative of the problem not definitive of a shadow price, and along with 
physical measures (e.g. mortality, morbidity, material decay, pollutant deposition).  More 
generally, physical measures of pollution are required because the concern is impacts on the 
needs of all.  Maximum tolerable levels of air and water pollution, minimum health standards, 
preventive medicine, medical care and education should be established to counter the failures 
of markets to achieve them.  Economists should reform their subject to focus on “an 
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objectification of the content of individual needs and social welfare in terms of existential 
social minima” (Kapp 1965, p. 67).  That is, for example, an acceptable level of air pollution 
in an urban area is not a matter of financial returns to polluters over and above what the 
polluted will accept in compensation, or the ability to pay of the polluted to compensate 
polluters to stop inflicting harm.  Distribution of harm in society is inherently an ethical and 
political issue about social and collective goals.17 
Kapp recognised that industrial managers in planned economic systems operating 
under competitive institutional arrangements are just as liable to shift costs as profit seeking 
capitalists operating in competitive market systems.  The analysis applied equally to a Russian 
Soviet style incentive system as to that of the Western market economies.  Indeed, the 
problem might be found in any productive activity where the emphasis is placed on 
competing with and achieving advantage over others or obtaining income by causing damage 
to others.  Municipalities and public or planning authorities might create environmental 
degradation by attracting industries to increase their tax income, sacrificing environmental 
quality for revenue, or seeking short-run solvency by ignoring social costs (Kapp 1971 
[1950], p. xvi).  Thus, long before the spread of ‘new public management’, Kapp warned that 
attempts to make public decision-making more economically ‘rational’ could backfire (Ibid).  
In recent decades, urban sprawl, gentrification, shopping malls, industrial parks and the 
general drive for growth might all be seen in this light, as income generating competitively 
driven costs shifting. 
Social cost shifting appears prevalent from littering to dumping toxic chemicals in 
rivers or exporting electronic waste from global North to South.  While Kapp’s thesis is 
primarily directed at productive activities, the problem of cost shifting is also evident in 
consumption and activities at the level of the household.  This highlights the need to address 
                                                 
17 As fleetingly noted by Coase (1960, p. 43) in his contradictory reference to Knight. 
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the structure of consumerist throwaway society, of which Kapp (1978 [1963] chapter 12) 
addressed some aspects, such as high pressure sales promotion and psycho-cultural impacts.  
More generally this relates to what Brand and Wissen (2017) term the imperial mode of living 
and Hornberg (2017) terms unequal exchange.  The same institutional dynamic of cost 
shifting underlies both.  The problem then becomes systemic and self-reinforcing between 
production and consumption. 
Kapp (2011) recognised and explained such structural phenomena as circular 
cumulative causation.  This describes how social mechanisms are established that create 
feedbacks, reproduce social processes and accentuate the occurrence of specific behaviours.  
Gunnar Myrdal’s work on institutional racism is a good example of applying such analysis 
(Berger 2017, p. 188).  This also highlights the aspect of institutionalism in Kapp’s theory.  
He had written extensively on the link with institutional economics and highlighted this as a 
central concern of his work on social costs.18  Consistent with Kapp, institutions can be 
understood as ranging from conventions to norms to rules and regulations (Vatn 2005).  Such 
institutions structure social interactions and create mechanisms that encourage some 
behaviours and restrict others.  Achieving collectively determined social goals and objectives 
then becomes the aim of explicitly designated economic institutions.  This stands in direct 
contrast to the unregulated self-interested individualism forming a central axiom of 
neoclassical economics and placed at the core of neoliberal ideology. 
Kapp then advocated government regulation and planning as a means to achieve 
socially acceptable standards for pollutants, e.g. natural balance, maximum permissible 
                                                 
18 Bringing the work closer to a tradition in institutional analysis was given as the reason why he had 
adjusted the book’s title (see the preface dated 1962 for the second edition of his book on social costs 
Kapp 1978 [1963] xxvii).  Another book specifically addressing the foundations of institutional 
economics was left incomplete when he died, but was finally published after some diligent research 
and editorial work by Berger and Steppacher (Kapp, Berger, and Steppacher 2011). 
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concentration, safe minimum standards and objective requirements of human health (Kapp 
1978 [1963], p. 93).  This corresponds with a critical institutional economic approach that 
emphasises the cumulative character of social causation and the need for objective criteria of 
social welfare for the appraisal of the social efficiency of economic systems.  It also raises the 
importance of addressing the quality of human life and behaviour under different institutional 
arrangements (Kapp 1978 [1963], p. xxvii). 
Thus, in Kapp’s work, pollution is one amongst many costs that are shifted to and 
borne by third persons and the community as a whole.  Externalities are not external to 
economic actors decisions, but part of how the modern growth economy, and its profit 
seeking and utility maximising self-obsessed actors are incentivised to behave within the 
competitive institutions of the price-making market system.  Cost shifting can be seen 
operating both environmentally, via pollution, but also socially in the relationships of the 
work place and the institutions of consumerism.  This is a fundamentally different critique 
than the ‘all social costs are minor problems and can be optimally fixed by taxes’ approach 
attributed, misleadingly, to Pigou, or the ‘lets allocate private property rights and leave agents 
to seek their own selfish-interests’ approach attributed, equally misleadingly, to Coase.  Both 
those approaches assumed societal choices should be left to individual agents ignoring the 
formation of social goals as distinct from individual choice.  Kapp also noted how such 
individual choice models ignore the variety of actual contexts and institutions within which 
decision are made and that this affects the outcome.  Kapp was working towards a new ‘social 
economics’ with a realist descriptive and explanatory approach (Spash 2012). 
Despite his originality and publishing substantively on pollution decades in advance of 
others, Kapp’s work failed to impact substantively on the new economics of the environment.  
It was indeed an attack on the foundations of neoclassical economics which meant those who 
chose to embed themselves in that school could not pursue the logic of cost shifting.  The 
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distinction between unintended minor marginal external costs and deliberate cost shifting for 
profit meant mild reform was replaced by the need for systemic change.  As Kapp (1971 
[1950], p. xiv) noted, his critical view ran counter to the presuppositions and biases of 
conventional economic analysis and as a result did not meet with general approval.  In his 
review of the post-war literature on externalities Mishan (1971b) did not even bother to 
mention Kapp’s work.  American institutional economists gave him the most recognition 
(Berger 2017, p. 24),19 but they themselves were losing ground within the profession and 
being replaced by a mix of neoclassical modellers, econometricians and neoliberals. 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Environmental economists know the market fails to price all the benefits and costs associated 
with the use of natural resources and the environment.  However, this perspective has been 
constrained lest it go too far and threaten the political utopian project of achieving an (ideally) 
unregulated price-making market economy.  A fundamental point of contention in the 
environmental economists approach is the importance they can afford to give to pollution.  
The recognition that pollution is all pervasive overthrows the idea that markets can operate as 
socially efficient means of achieving a Pareto optimal outcome.  If corrective intervention is 
widespread then the self-regulating price systems is replaced by central planning.  Thus, the 
response was to caricature the problem and impose paradigmatic limits that removed all 
theoretically disturbing aspects of social and physical reality. 
There is in this an underlying ideological battle.  Environmental economics developed 
during the cold war in the USA and so adopted facets of political ideology from that context 
which have ever since been employed against the environmental movement.  This has meant 
denouncing planning under the rhetoric of ‘command and control’ in opposition to the ‘free 
                                                 
19 The title of Kapp’s (1963) revised work relates to Veblen's Theory of Business Enterprise. 
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market’.  A hidden ideological and political discourse has then been employed to frame the 
debate as totalitarianism vs. democracy, communism vs. liberalism, evil vs. good.  Standard 
setting, planning, regulation and socialism were pushed off the agenda.  There would be no 
repeat of the socialist calculation debate.  The environmental economists approach was to be 
cleansed by rejecting administered (or other forms of) set-prices, for achieving a range of 
social provisioning goals (e.g. just, fair and equitable allocation), in favour of taxes set to 
reflect monetised externalities that help correct markets to achieve efficiency by ‘getting the 
prices right’.  Price-making markets then appear as correctible, if not perfectible, and are 
always the ideal against which policy is to be measured.  The struggle over environmental 
economics was short lived and soon over.  By the 1980s, despite remaining distinctions, the 
field had become disassociated from any planning approaches and allied to the neoliberal 
position of a strong government empowering the market to find its own way to the ultimate 
solution. 
The understanding of pollution recognised by Kapp (1950) and twenty years later 
recognised and (supposedly) adopted by Kneese, Ayres and dˊArge was within another 
decade eradicated from environmental economics and the dominant discourse established in 
the new textbooks.  Cost shifting and Kapp’s writings were quite simply ignored once 
environmental economics became incorporate into the deductivist mathematical mainstream.  
An ideological commitment to market institutions was combined with a paradigmatic belief in 
optimal prices that allocate resources (Pareto) efficiently.  Pollution as a marginalised concern 
external to the economic agent was assumed easily correctible allowing markets to function as 
if self-regulating institutions.  The position was established despite repeated recognition of 
problems going back to Pigou (1920).  Along the way, Pigou was caricatured by Coase as an 
advocate of government intervention via optimal taxes.  Coase’s contradictory, vague and 
elusive arguments, making false claims and lacking references, earned him a Sveriges 
 
33 
Riksbank (‘Nobel’) Prize.  While Stigler, another prize winner, produce a neoliberal ‘Stigler 
Theorem’ that he attributed to Coase, where property rights and new markets solve the 
failings of market capitalism. 
Environmental economists also denied their own foundational ecologically and 
physically based insights in order to conform with neoclassical economic theory.  The 
orthodox treatment of pollution events as minor correctible market failures was know to 
conflict with the realisation—already apparent in the 1960s and the then emerging field of 
systems ecology—that production and consumption in a modern economy continuously 
creates harm on a scale and with consequences that are major problems for human society as 
well as non-human Nature.  At the end of the day, environmental economics became a 
narrow, constricted, self-defeating and dogmatic approach that offered neoclassical 
conformism and market reformism that increasingly sided with neoliberal capitalism. 
The rise of neoliberalism hollowed-out central government and replaced it with central 
corporatism.  The successful dichotomisation of the recommended policy response followed 
and became part of economic dogma for addressing pollution as an externality.  The 1st 
edition of the New Palgrave dictionary provides a useful authoritative summary: 
“The standard remedies for these market failures involve minor modifications of the 
market mechanism, including Pigovian taxes (Pigou, 1920) on harmful externalities, or 
appropriate Coasian (Coase, 1960) legal entitlements to, for example, clean air.” 
(Feldman 1987 emphasis added) 
In the 2nd edition (2008) this was updated to change one word ‘minor’ to ‘various’, and the 
statement remained unchanged in the 3rd edition (2018).  This is the state of the art in 
mainstream economics on pollution. 
The justification for government intervention today remains that prices, whether 
adjusted directly by taxes or indirectly by new pollution permits markets, can be used to 
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reflect resource scarcities and allow the operation of (otherwise unregulated) price-making 
markets.  For environmental economists the extent of any externality (i.e. harm created to 
others both human and non-human) can be assessed through monetary valuation, which can 
also determine the optimal level of pollution by setting the value of all the harms against the 
costs of pollution control.  Corrections to prices (e.g. via taxes) are supposedly objectively 
calculable ‘shadow prices’ reflecting individual’s ‘true’ preferences and can be estimated 
using a range of monetary valuation methods.  These have been extended from revealing 
preferences in actual markets to inferring values for everything—from cultural monuments to 
biodiversity loss to human life—based on hypothetical market-like trade-offs from stated 
preferences.  Regardless of the scale or complexity of the problems or their extent, in time or 
space, economists will be able to recommend whether, and to what extent, action is required 
to achieve the (Pareto) efficient level of pollution going into the environment. 
A prime example is human induced climate change. A high profile internationally 
acclaimed study by Stern et al. (2006) on the economics of climate change earned its lead 
author a professorship, knighthood and seat in the UK’s House of Lords.  The report refers to 
climate change as “the greatest market failure the world has ever seen” (Ibid, p. viii, 1), and 
then claims this can be corrected by adjusting prices to include the value of the externalities.  
Hence: “The first essential element of climate change policy is carbon pricing” (Ibid, p. 308).  
Tradable pollution permits could send the price signal.  Two further neoliberal policies were 
recommended: supporting private sector innovation to produce more efficient technology and 
incentivising individual consumer responsibility.  Stern et al. was merely one in a line of 
economic studies claiming to have actually calculated a policy relevant monetary valuation of 
the social costs of human greenhouse gas emissions, the magic optimal number defining 
efficiency (see Spash 2002).  In 2018, environmental economist Nordhaus, the longest 
running publisher of such numbers, received a Sveriges Riksbank (‘Nobel’) Prize.  In 2019, 
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over 3000, mainly American, economists, including 27 other Riksbank Prize winners, 
endorsed a ‘carbon tax’ because “[s]ubstituting a price signal for cumbersome regulations will 
promote economic growth”.20  The tax, à la Beckerman, is treated as if a minor adjustment 
that will allow an otherwise self-regulating capitalist market system to (Pareto) efficiently 
allocate resources.  Faith in the paradigms of economic growth and price-making markets 
remains unshaken in the face of climate catastrophe. 
Kapp describes a very different world from the now hegemonic neoliberal-
neoclassical synthesis.  The capital accumulating economy, with its emphasis on competition 
and individual self-interest, is the road to social misery and environmental destruction.  The 
social metabolism of the economic structure needs to be explicitly planned and the institutions 
of exploitation and alienation deconstructed and replaced by those of social inclusion.  
Environmental and social harms need to be addressed via social minima to provide for basic 
objective needs and protection of the innocent from harm.  Monetary environmental valuation 
is neither theoretically sound nor practically useful, and results in misdirecting public policy.  
Planning not markets are the favoured approach and this requires participation, accountability 
and multi-level governance.  This is the agenda awaiting a radical social ecological 
reformation of economics. 
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